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Many studies suggest that balanced budget rules can restrain sovereign debt and lower sovereign
borrowing costs, even if those rules are never enforced in court. Typically, this is explained
as a result of a legal deterrence logic, in which the threat of judicial enforcement deters
sovereigns from violating the rules. By contrast, we argue that balanced budget rules work
by coordinating decentralized punishment of sovereigns by bond markets, rather than by
posing a credible threat of judicial enforcement. Therefore, the clarity of the focal point
provided by the rule, rather than the strength of its judicial enforcement mechanisms, deter-
mines its eﬀectiveness. We develop a formal model that captures the logic of our argument,
and we assess this model using data on US states. We then consider implications of our ar-
gument for the impact of the balanced budget rules recently imposed on eurozone states in
the Fiscal Compact Treaty. [148 words]
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Introduction
How can sovereigns be restrained from excessive, unsustainable borrowing? Can they be
restrained by law? Can they be restrained by markets? The long history of sovereign defaults
and the economic suﬀering that follows in their wake highlights the enduring importance
of these questions (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ 2009). The eurozone sovereign debt crisis makes
these questions salient today and underlines the fact that they pose a particular challenge for
federal-type systems.
Any federal or confederal system that shares a common currency and in which member
states control important aspects of fiscal policy faces a fundamental challenge: it must find
a credible way to discourage excessive borrowing by states. In the event of an asymmetric
shock to a state’s economy or simply of a sudden revelation of a state fiscal crisis, there will be
substantial pressure on the federal level to make fiscal transfers to bail out the struggling state.
However, if the federal level is perceived as guaranteeing the solvency of member states, this
will create moral hazard encouraging states to borrow excessively (and encouraging lenders
to indulge them). Excessive borrowing by state governments, in turn, may threaten the value
of the common currency and over-all macroeconomic stability. This dilemma has, at various
points in time, plagued federal-type polities across the world, from the United States, to
Brazil, to Argentina, to Germany, to the European Union (Rodden 2002, 2006, Wibbels
2000, Triesman 2000).
In recent years, judicially enforceable fiscal rules, such as balanced budget requirements,
debt brakes and expenditure limits, have become increasingly popular around the world in
countries struggling to limit their debt (Liu andWebb 2011; Hallerberg 2010).1 As we discuss
below, the preponderance of empirical studies—most of which focus on US states2—suggest
1In particular, this approach has become common in federal-type systems that combine a common currency
with state control over important aspects of fiscal policy.
2In the US, 49 of the 50 US states have some sort of balanced budget requirement established in state law.
Most of these laws were initially put in place in the 1840s, after a number of US states faced fiscal crises and nine
states defaulted. US states imposed these balanced budget rules on themselves in order to restore the confidence
of investors (Sylla and Grinath 2004, Wallis and Weingast 2008, Wallis 2000).
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that entrenching balanced budget rules in state law can in fact limit state deficits and reduce
state borrowing costs. These studies suggest that the stricter the legal enforcement mecha-
nisms for these rules, the better they work (Bohn and Inman 1996; Claeys 2008, Feld et al
2010, Kiewiet and Szakaly 1996, Lutz and Follete 2012)3. Yet, the same studies also demon-
strate that these rules are almost never actually enforced in court. Most authors explain this
through a legal deterrence logic: the fear of judicial enforcement of balanced budget rules
dissuades politicians from breaking those rules in the first place.
Many scholars have drawn lessons for the eurozone from the literature on US state bal-
anced budget rules (Inman 1998, 2003; Corsetti and Roubini 1996; Eichengreen and von
Hagen 1996; Bordo, Markiewicz and Jonung 2011; McNamara 2011; Henning and Kessler
2012). One important lesson drawn by many is that the key to the eﬀectiveness of any bal-
anced budget rule is the strength of its judicial enforcement mechanisms. As they seek to
reform eurozone governance in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, EU leaders have placed
great emphasis on empowering national and EU courts to enforce deficit and debt limits.
This is manifest in the Fiscal Compact Treaty (formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union), one of the cornerstones of the
EU’s eﬀort to reform eurozone governance. The Treaty requires the twenty-five member
states that have ratified it to enshrine a “structurally balanced budget rule”⁴ in domestic law
where it can be enforced by domestic courts.
We argue that the eﬀectiveness of balanced budget rules does not in fact depend on a
legal deterrence logic, as suggested by much of the literature. Though law often exerts its
influence through the threat of coercive enforcement by a central authority (and behavioral
changes that occur in the shadow of that threat), we argue that this is not the role law plays in
the realm of balanced budget rules. Instead, we argue that to the extent that balanced budget
3States put in place deficit and debt restrictions in order to make a long-term, credible commitment to
fiscal responsibility—in the hope that this commitment will reduce their borrowing costs. Thus, if legally
enforceable debt brakes ‘work’ they should both enable the sovereign to borrow at reasonable rates and prevent
the accumulation of unsustainable debt loads
⁴We explain below how the Treaty defines a structurally balanced budget.
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rules “work”, they do so by acting as a focal point or coordination device that facilitates de-
centralized punishment of sovereigns by bond markets. Our argument builds on pioneering
works by scholars such as Goldstein and Woglom (1992), Bayoumi, Goldstein & Woglom
(1995) and Lowry and Alt (2001) who also suggest that it is the bond markets rather than the
courts that discipline states who violate such fiscal rules. We advance on their contributions
by linking their insights to the literature on the role of law as a coordinating device (Hadfield
and Weingast 2011, 2012, 2013; McAdams 2000a, 2000b; McAdams and Nagler 2005; Sun-
stein 1995). Legal scholars have developed a sophisticated literature exploring how law can
influence behavior not by threatening government imposed sanctions, but by coordinating
decentralized punishment of rule violators by various societal actors.
Applying this perspective suggests that many empirical studies on the US positing a causal
relationship between the strictness of state balanced budget rules and their eﬀectiveness may
suﬀer from an omitted variable bias, in that they have ignored the impact that the clarity of
rules has on their eﬀectiveness. Put simply, if balanced budget rules work by coordinating
decentralized punishment by bond investors rather than by posing a credible threat of judicial
enforcement, then the clarity of the focal point provided by the rule, rather than the strength
of its judicial enforcement mechanisms, should be the key to its eﬀectiveness. These rules
are unlikely to ever be enforced in court, and market participants recognize this. Balanced
budget rules will work better where they provide a clear focal point for investors, not where
they are designed to be stringently enforced by judicial authorities.
The implications of this argument for the eurozone are not encouraging. First, the
EU lacks some of the background conditions that have enabled bond markets to play an
eﬀective disciplinary role in other contexts above all the fact that the EU has set up a bailout
fund undermines the potential for market discipline of sovereigns. Second, the types of
structurally balanced budget rules called for in the Fiscal Compact Treaty do not provide a
clear focal point for bond markets and are therefore unlikely to be eﬀective. Our argument
also has important implications beyond the US and EU contexts. With fiscal rules becoming
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increasingly popular around the world, our findings suggest that the designers of those rules
focus less on their judicial enforceability and more on their clarity and the ease with which
bond markets can use them as focal points.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. First, we review existing lit-
erature on whether and how balanced rules work, drawing on studies of the US and other
political systems. Second, we present our argument on how balanced budget rules work to
coordinate decentralized punishment by bond markets, even in the absence of any realistic
prospect of judicial enforcement. Third, we examine the empirical record of fiscal rules in
the US. We then review the structure of the balanced budget rules being put into place in
accordance with the fiscal compact treaty and assess whether they can be expected to serve
as eﬀective focal points. Finally, we conclude.
Theoretical Perspectives
In federal-type systems, the central government must find ways to restrain unsustainable bor-
rowing by states, borrowing which, if left unchecked, can lead to disastrous spillover eﬀects
on neighboring states and ultimately to demands for federal bailouts. Markets alone fail to
adequately discipline sovereigns. If they did, as Bayoumi et al (1995, p.1046) explain, then
yields on sovereign debt would “rise smoothly at an increasing rate with the level of borrow-
ing, thereby providing the borrower with an incentive to restrain excessive borrowing.” But
in fact yields often do not rise smoothly and excessive borrowing is not eﬀectively restrained.
Rather, sovereigns often build up substantial debt at low borrowing costs, and then face some
type of fiscal crisis which prompts market panic, a rapid spike in borrowing costs to unsus-
tainable levels. Instead of playing a helpful role deterring the accumulation of excessive debt,
markets often react too late and then so forcefully that they help drive states to default.
To make up for the shortcomings of pure market discipline, many scholars and policy
makers have called for the imposition of binding fiscal rules, including balanced budget rules.
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With the imposition of such rules, law and courts are expected to force politicians to engage
in responsible fiscal policy. One approach to examining the eﬀects of formal fiscal rules is
to analyze the outcome of public finances. Focusing on the institutional variation across
American states, Bohn and Inman (1996) find that strict balanced budget rules have a greater
deficit-reducing eﬀect than more lenient rules. Furthermore, their results suggest that retro-
spective rules such as the no-carryover rule are more eﬀective in lowering the likelihood of a
state running a deficit in a given year than prospective rules. The benefits of strict fiscal rules
are not restricted to lower deficits, however. A number of studies find that states with strict
fiscal rules tend to issue less debt (Bunche 1991, Eichengreen 1992, Kiewiet and Szakaly
1996, von Hagen 1991), have lower expenditures (Rueben 1996), and are quicker to restore
fiscal balance following an economic shock (Poterba 1994).
Similar results emerge from outside the United States. In a sample of Latin Ameri-
can countries, Alesina et al (1999) find that strict fiscal rules may contribute to lower fiscal
deficits. Feld et al (2011) find that the existence and strength of fiscal rules in Swiss cantons
are associated with lower bond risk premia of bonds. Finally, cross-national studies on EU
member states find that fiscal rules appear to be eﬀective at lowering public sector debt levels
and deficits (Debrun et al 2008, Hallerberg et al 2007).
At the same time however, other scholars question the eﬀectiveness of fiscal rules. Some
argue that fiscally responsible countries do not need rules and fiscally irresponsible countries
may not achieve fiscal discipline even with rules (Kennedy and Robbins 2001). If so, then
fiscal prudence is less a function of fiscal rules than country-specific characteristics, such as
political institutions. Briﬀault (1996) charges that in the US fiscal rules—state constitutional
debt provisions in particular—are inconsistent, vague, and routinely circumvented by creative
financing devices. In the EU, Iara and Wolﬀ (2010) examine the relationship between nu-
merical fiscal rules and government bond spreads and find that fiscal rules exert only a weak
eﬀect and that any impact occurs only in times of high risk and market stress. Similarly, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) finds no significant eﬀect of fiscal rules on bond spreads
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of 22 OECD countries (IMF 2009).
With the various qualifications noted above, it seems fair to conclude that most studies
on balanced budget rules suggest that they at least have some positive eﬀect on restraining
sovereign debt and lowering sovereign borrowing costs. But how do these laws work given
that they are never actually enforced in court? The prevailing argument is that they work
through a form of legal deterrence. Bohn and Inman (1996) spell out this logic in their
seminal article on state balanced budget rules:
“To our knowledge no case has yet been brought to the state supreme court
challenging a state deficit under the state’s no-carry-over rule. We interpret this
fact not as a weakness, but rather as a strength of the supreme court enforcement
mechanism. Perhaps the last place the state legislature and governor want their
budget decision made is in the state court. The threat to take a case to the courts
under the no-carry-over rule is therefore eﬀective, and, as our results seem to
show, a balanced budget follows.” (p.54)⁵
Like Bohn and Inman (1996), a number of other studies suggest that the threat of judicial
enforcement casts a long shadow; fear of the enforcement through the courts keeps politicians
in line such that, no judicial enforcement is needed (Claeys 2008, Feld et al 2010, Kiewiet
and Szakaly 1996, Lutz and Follete 2012).
We find this causal explanation of how balanced budget rules influence government be-
havior unconvincing. First, Bohn and Inman’s (1996) assertion that, “Perhaps the last place
the state legislature and governor want their budget decisions made is in the state court,”
is not compelling. The prospect of the judiciary making budget decisions is not necessar-
ily anathema to law makers. In fiscal policy, as in many sensitive areas of policy making,
law makers may be willing to punt sensitive questions to the courts (Graber 1993; Lovell
⁵While no such case had been brought to a state supreme court at the time of Bohn and Inman’s 1996
article, Briﬀault (2008, p.429) notes that a 2004 case in New Jersey, Lance v. McGreevey, “appears to be the
only time any state supreme court has ever held that a state failed to balance its budget as the state’s constitution
requires.”
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2003; Frymer 2003; Whittington 2005). As Yoo and Gaziano (2011) put it, “If legislators
know that courts will be lurking in the background, they may simply abdicate their own
responsibilities to comply with a balanced-budget requirement.”
Second, the experience of state courts enforcing fiscal rules in the US federal system sug-
gests that they are inclined to show political branches considerable deference in this field—a
posture which would hardly strike fear into the hearts of lawmakers. Though there are few
cases of litigation involving balanced budget requirements, there is an extensive case law
concerning other fiscal rules. As Briﬀault (2003:939-940) explains, in adjudicating cases in-
volving such rules state courts have treated fiscal limits not as issues of fundamental rights to
be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts, but rather as matters of public policy best left to
legislatures. The New Jersey Supreme Court summarized this accommodating judicial atti-
tude in a 1972 ruling explaining, “the modern science of government has found a method
of avoiding [the debt] clause, and the courts have approved it.”⁶
If lawmakers have less to fear from the prospect of judicial enforcement of balanced budget
rules than the existing literature has theorized, how could it be that these rules nevertheless
reduce state government deficits and state government borrowing costs?
A distinctive line of research on balanced budget rules developed by Goldstein and
Woglom (1992), Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995), and Lowry and Alt (2001) sug-
gests that it is the bond markets rather than the courts that discipline states who violate such
fiscal rules. Building on this line of research, we argue that balanced budget rules serve as
a coordinating device for bond markets. These laws provide a focal point, helping bond
investors to coordinate on when to punish states for running excessive deficits by demanding
higher yields. The dissuasive eﬀect of these rules comes not from the expectation that a
court will enforce them strictly, taking control of fiscal policy away from elected politicians.
Rather, where these rules exist, politicians recognize that any indication that they are vio-
lating the rule is likely to be met with a punishment imposed by bond markets (i.e. a spike
⁶New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545(N.J. 1972) quoted in Briﬀault
2003, p.940.
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in borrowing costs). This decentralized punishment would be felt before and would be far
more painful than any penalty that might eventually be meted out by a court. To the extent
that states obey balanced rules, they do so not due to fear of centralized judicial enforcement,
but due to fear of the bond markets.
Though the scholars mentioned above have emphasized the role bond markets play in
enforcing fiscal rules, and though some of them (Lowry and Alt 2001) have explicitly sug-
gested that balanced budget rules can play a role as a coordinating device, our argument
diﬀers from theirs in several ways. Lowry and Alt (2001) suggest that investors lack adequate
information on the intentions of government oﬃcials and that a particular form of balanced
budget rule can help investors to “extract information from noisy signals” and coordinate
their beliefs about how governments will react to one-time deficits (2001, p.52).
We suggest a diﬀerent understanding of the coordinating role that balanced budget rules
can play. Balanced budget laws help signal individual buyers the point at which other bond
buyers are likely to withhold further financing; these rules thus create a focal point that can
help investors coordinate on when to punish sovereigns by demanding far higher rates. In
most cases, the fear of this coordinated market punishment is enough to restrain sovereigns
from violating the balanced budget rules. On rare occasions where the rules are violated, the
imposition of market discipline may quickly pressure sovereigns to rein in their deficits.
Scholars of political economy typically regard law as a sanctioning device, its impact on
behavior a function of how strict and well-enforced it is. Thus in most of the research on the
impact of fiscal rules, scholars focus on the strictness of the rules under the implicit assumption
that these rules work under the threat of legal enforcement. However, as McAdams (2000)
points out, law can aﬀect behavior “independent of the sanctions it threatens to impose, that
law works by what it says in addition to what it does (emphasis added)”. Law can help actors
overcome coordination problems by acting as a focal point, which helps provide information
and expectations on how others will behave; law is expressive.
Given its expressive function, law can help participants coordinate punishment against
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a violator even in the absence of a formal enforcement mechanism (Hadfield and Weingast
2011, 2012, 2013). Hadfield and Weingast extend McAdams (2000) and others’ arguments
by focusing on the characteristics that such a law must have. They argue that “an important
role of legal process, therefore, is to make rulings that reduce ambiguity”. It is not suﬃcient
that a law is common knowledge, it must also be clear. While other analyses examine how
law, by acting as a focal point, can facilitate equilibrium selection, Hadfield and Weingast
(2011) contend that a coordination equilibrium exists only if players prefer the payoﬀs from
coordinating successfully than those without coordination.
Following Hadfield and Weingast (2011), our model assumes that individuals often hold
diﬀerent views, which makes coordination challenging and decentralized punishment dif-
ficult. We also make a similar assumption that each individual’s information is private and
unobservable by others. Unlike Hadfield and Weingast (2011) however, we make two mod-
ifications. First, the players in our model move simultaneously and are unable to observe the
actions of other players prior to their decisions, as opposed to the sequential nature of Had-
field and Weingast’s (2011) model, where players are willing to reveal information by taking
costly actions if the benefits from doing so are suﬃciently large. Second, we analyze explic-
itly how the clarity of a law—which Hadfield and Weingast (2011) stress as one of the key
features of a coordinating device—aﬀects its ability to facilitate coordination.
To do so, we draw on recent advances in game theory—the theory of global games, pi-
oneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and brought to the forefront of modern game
theory by Morris and Shin (1998). Coordination games give rise to multiple equilibria.
The problem of equilibrium selection in such games is due to the assumption that all rele-
vant features of the game are common knowledge, or known to every player.⁷ A global game
removes the common knowledge of payoﬀs; the game becomes one of incomplete informa-
tion. Instead, players’ payoﬀs are a function of some unknown ‘state’ variable, a feature of
the environment that aﬀects the payoﬀs of all players. In our model, the state variable is a
⁷More precisely, equilibrium multiplicity in coordination environments is due to the assumption that all
players know the payoﬀs and play of the game.
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government’s fiscal situation.⁸ In addition, players’ payoﬀs depend on the actions of other
players in a particular way—the greater the number of players taking the same action, the
higher the payoﬀ to each individual player; players’ actions are strategic complements.
In brief, our model shows that the clearer a balanced budget rule, the more eﬀective it is
as a coordinating device. Only when a rule is suﬃciently clear can it serve as an eﬀective focal
point to facilitate decentralized enforcement. This implies that balanced budget rules can be
eﬀective in enabling states to borrow at sustainable rates while simultaneously preventing
them from building up unsustainable debts—but that their eﬀectiveness depends on their
clarity and not on the strictness of their legal enforcement mechanisms.
The Model
There is a continuum of buyers in a bond market indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Each risk-neutral
buyer chooses some amount of bonds, bi 2 R+, to purchase from a government. The simul-
taneous decisions of buyers form the aggregate level of financing the government receives, B.
We assume that each buyer is “small’’ in the sense that an individual buyer’s stake is negligible
as a proportion of the whole.⁹
Two components enter into the decision-making process of each buyer. First, each buyer
cares about the government’s fiscal situation, . A buyer would not want to purchase bonds
from a government that is running unsustainable fiscal policies and may be potentially insol-
vent. Conversely, a government in good fiscal health makes for a sound investment. This
uncertainty over the government’s fiscal situation is known as fundamental uncertainty. Second,
each buyer also cares about other buyers’ beliefs and their decisions to finance the govern-
ment’s debt; an uncertainty referred to as strategic uncertainty. Players care about one another’s
⁸Morris and Shin (2002) define global games as “games of incomplete information whose type space is
determined by the players each observing a noisy signal of the underlying state.” Global games have been
applied to a wide variety of contexts from speculative attacks and currency crises (Morris and Shin 1998,
1999) to riots, revolution and political regime change (Atkeson 2000, Edmonds 2008, 2011). Of late, political
scientists have also started to adopt these models (see Dewan and Myatt 2008, 2012).
⁹This assumption is not crucial for our results but greatly simplifies our exposition. Our results also hold
for a finite number of buyers.
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beliefs and decisions about financing a governments debt, because they recognize that the
sustainability of the government’s debt is itself a product of the bond markets’ willingness
to finance that debt at reasonable rates. In other words, rational behavior for the individual
bond buyer is not simply based on an assessment of economic fundamentals, but on their
beliefs about the likely actions of other bond buyers.1⁰
Let  denote the weight that each buyer places on other buyers’ actions. That is, 0 <
 < 1 captures the extent of complementarity. Each buyer’s concern for choosing the right
value of financing given the government’s fiscal situation is thus 1   . We can then write
each buyer’s utility as follows:11
ui = [ (1  )| {z }
concern for government’s fiscal situation
+ B|{z}
concern for other buyers’ actions
]bi
The optimal strategy for buyer i is given by the first-order condition:




bi di, the average action of the mass of buyers, andEi() is the expectation
operator for i.12
The government’s true fiscal situation  is unknown to the buyers. As such, each buyer
relies on her research to obtain information and form beliefs about . Since buyers’ prior ex-
periences are diﬀerent, they do not share the same information.13 Let this private information
be represented by:
1⁰As Morris and Shin (2003) puts it, rational behavior “depends not only on economic agents’ beliefs about
common fundamentals, but also depends on beliefs of higher-order—that is, players’ beliefs about other players’
beliefs, players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs, and so on.”
11We normalize the cost of purchasing bonds to zero.
12Since 0 <  < 1, each buyer places positive weight on both the expected value of  and the expected
actions of other buyers B. The fixed point of this best-response condition constitutes the equilibrium of the
game.
13Put another way, buyers have heterogeneous beliefs about  that are unknown to other buyers.
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xi =  + i; i  N(0; 2x)
where i represents buyer i’s idiosyncratic uncertainty over , is independent of , inde-
pendent and identically distributed across buyers with mean zero and variance 2x over the
standard normal. xi is a private signal in the sense that it is not observable by others and only
known to buyer i.
Suppose the government announces a balanced budget rule that is observable to all buyers;
this rule is common knowledge. Let this public signal be denoted by:
y =  + ;   N(0; 2y)
where  is independent of , independent and identically distributed over all buyers with
mean zero and variance 2y drawn from the standard normal. The distribution of  is referred
to as the common prior.
Whereas buyers have diﬀerent priors in the absence of a balanced budget rule, the buyers
can now update their heterogeneous priors using the public signal and thus share a common
prior. That is, each buyer now receives a common signal about the government’s fiscal situ-
ation, which influences their expectations about other buyers’ likely actions. The balanced
budget rule serves two purposes: (1) it conveys information about fundamentals and (2) pro-
vides a focal point which signals individual buyers the point at which other bond buyers are
likely to withhold further financing.
With the common prior, buyer i now forms her posterior belief by updating her private
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Buyer i’s expected value of  is then:
Ei(jxi; y) = y + xi
 + 
Definition 1. An equilibrium of the game consists of a set of beliefs for buyer i and a set of strategies
bi : R2 ! R such that for all (xi; y),
ui(bijxi; y) = argmax
bi
(1  )Ei() + Ei(B) (1)
Definition 2. A linear equilibrium is any strategy that satisfies 1 and is linear in xi and y.
We solve for a linear equilibrium of this game and show that not only does such an
equilibrium exist, it is unique.
Proposition 1. There exists a linear equilibrium in the game, bi = xi + (1  )y, where
 =
(1  )







See Technical Appendix for proof.
Proposition 2. [Morris and Shin 2002] The equilibrium identified in proposition 1 is the unique
equilibrium of the game.
See Technical Appendix for proof.
Given the equilibrium strategy of the buyer, we consider now how buyer i’s optimal
decision, bi , changes with respect to x and y, the clarity of buyer i’s private signal and the
government’s balanced budget rule respectively. Recall that:
Ei(jxi; y) = y + xi
 + 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For a given x, a reduction in y—which corresponds to a clearer signal—leads buyer i
to place greater weight on the public signal relative to her private signal and consequently
improves coordination. Where a balanced budget rule is suﬃciently clear, violations of that
rule are more likely to trigger the bond markets to withhold financing. Knowing that viola-
tions of clear balanced budget rules would elicit a decentralized punishment by bond markets,
governments will avoid violating those rules in the first place. On the contrary, a vague sig-
nal, i.e. y is large, leads buyers to discount the information contained in the (noisy) public
signal and instead place greater weight on their private signals, thereby making coordination
more diﬃcult. In other words, where a balanced budget rule is not suﬃciently clear, viola-
tions of that rule will be more diﬃcult to observe and will not provide bond markets with a
clear focal point. Knowing that violations of a vague rule are unlikely to elicit a decentralized
punishment by bond markets, governments have little incentive to respect the rule.
In sum, the model illustrates that a balanced budget rule can act as a focal point for the
coordination of decentralized punishment by bond markets. More importantly, it shows that
these rules need not be backed by the threat of legal enforcement to be eﬀective; instead they
can be backed by market deterrence. At the same time, focal points are not created equal.
The extent to which a balanced budget rule can facilitate coordination is a function of its
clarity. In particular, changes in the degree of clarity between private and public signals can
aﬀect the extent of coordination and thus the eﬀectiveness of the rule. The clearer a balanced
budget rule, the better it is as a focal point and, therefore, the more eﬀective it is.
With this in mind, we specify the following hypotheses:
H1. The clearer a balanced budget rule, the greater its eﬀectiveness.
H2. If a balanced budget rule is unclear, increasing the strictness of legal enforcement will not increase
its eﬀectiveness.
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Empirical Applications: The US and the EU
While there is a rich literature on the eﬀects of fiscal rules and fiscal institutions in EU
member countries (Hallerberg and Wolﬀ 2006), balanced budget rules at the national level
are a recent phenomenon and the Fiscal Compact Treaty only took eﬀect from January 2013.
Given the absence of data on the impact of member state balanced budget rules in the EU
context, we first turn to the US to conduct a quantitative analysis of our argument. After
presenting data on the impact of the clarity of balanced budget rules in the US, we return to
the case of the EU and assess the empirical implications of our argument there.
State Balanced Budget Rules in the US
Most quantitative studies on the impact of state balanced budget rules in the US share two
similarities. First, they focus on examining the impact of rule strictness, which they opera-
tionalize using a measure of fiscal rule stringency compiled by the Advisory Commission of
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). Second, in measuring the impact of strictness, they use
a ‘hypothetical’ measure of bond yields drawn from the Chubb Relative Value Study.1⁴ Like
other studies, our analysis considers the impact of rule strictness measured with the ACIR
index; however, our analysis also considers the impact of rule clarity—a factor that has not
been explored in previous empirical studies. Moreover, where most previous studies rely on
data from the Chubb Relative Value Study for their dependent variable, we use a dataset of
US state general obligation bond credit ratings containing 521 observations between 1990-
1999 from Johnson and Kriz (2005), which we argue provides a superior measure of the
eﬀectiveness of balanced budget rules.
Dependent Variable: General Obligation (GO) Bond Credit Rating. We use credit ratings on
1⁴The Chubb Group of Insurance Companies’ “Relative Value Study” is a survey-based instrument con-
ducted every six months since 1973. This survey uses evaluations by 20 to 25 traders at major brokerage firms
that deal in tax-exempt bonds of “hypothetical” 20-year general-obligation bonds issued by 39 states relative
to the state of New Jersey.
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state GO bonds from the three main credit rating agencies as a proxy for a rule’s eﬀectiveness.
The data set comes from Johnson and Kriz (2005), who highlight the limitations of data
drawn from the Chubb Relative Value Study and the superiority of credit ratings as a measure
in studies of the impact of fiscal institutions. Credit ratings on GO bonds are arguably superior
to the Chubb survey data, first because they are based on actual market performance measures
and expectations, such as the government’s financial position, its debt burden, and economic
health. Furthermore, bond ratings aﬀect the interest costs of municipal debt; higher-rated
bonds have lower rates than their lower-rated counterparts (Capeci 1991, Liu and Thakor
1984). Second, investors in the bond market pay attention to these ratings in making purchase
decisions. As such, states care about the ratings of their GO bonds.
Our measure of GO bond ratings is an ordinal variable coded five for the highest of the
three credit ratings on state GO bonds (Aaa for Moody’s, and AAA for Standard and Poor’s
and Fitch), four the next highest, all the way to zero (the lowest of the three credit ratings).
As a robustness check, we also run the models using credit ratings on GO bonds from each
agency separately and obtain similar results.
Independent Variables
Rule Clarity. To construct our rule clarity index, we use the following dichotomous items
from Alt, Lassen and Rose’s (2006) fiscal transparency index (#1, #2, #4, #8, #9) of the
American states:
1. Is the budget reported on a Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAPP) basis?
2. Are all appropriations included in a single bill?
3. Are the revenue forecasts binding?
4. Is the legislature prohibited from passing open-ended appropriations?
5. Does the budget require published performance measures?
17ACES CASES 2013.2 Kelemen and Teo
Each question is scored one if the answer is yes, and zero otherwise. The final index
ranges from zero to five, where higher values indicate greater clarity.
Rule Strictness. Like other studies of state balanced budget rules, we use the ACIR index
of rule strictness as our indicator of the strictness of legal enforcement. This measure ranges
from zero (states with lax requirements) to ten (states with stringent requirements). Vermont
is the only state that lacks a formal balanced budget rule.
Controls. We include a set of economic control variables at the state level: the unem-
ployment rate, per capita income, general revenue, and debt outstanding. Unemployment, as well
as higher levels of outstanding debt, may hinder a state’s ability to service its debt and nega-
tively impact its credit rating. Richer states, as captured by per capita income ought to have
better credit ratings. Finally, we include a set of political (dummy) controls to account for
the possible eﬀects of fiscal institutions: revenue limit, expenditure limit, debt issuance restriction,
and popular vote requirement (all coded one if such a restriction exists).
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables in our analysis.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable N Mean S.D.
Explanatory Variables
Rule Clarity 521 1.89 1.51
Rule Strictness 521 7.52 2.51
Economic Controls
Unemployment 521 5.97 1.36
Per Capita Income 521 18395.98 3219.61
General Revenue 521 1.69 0.47
Debt Outstanding 521 0.70 0.68
Political Controls
Revenue Limit 521 0.15 0.36
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Expenditure Limit 521 0.21 0.41
Debt Issuance Restriction 521 0.79 0.41
Popular Vote Requirement 521 0.30 0.46
Given our ordinal outcome, we estimate a series of ordered probit regressions. The first
examines the eﬀect of rule clarity and rule strictness with the consolidated bond credit ratings
from all three ratings agencies as the outcome. The second includes a two-way interaction
between clarity and strictness (clarity*strictness). As a robustness check, a third set of models
uses bond credit ratings from each individual agency (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s (S&P),
and Fitch) as the outcome.
Results
Table 2 presents the coeﬃcient estimates from the ordered probit regressions. Both rule
clarity and strictness have a statistically significant impact on credit ratings and are in the ex-
pected direction (column a). As clarity (and strictness) increases, the probability of achieving
a higher credit rating increases (H1).
Among the economic control variables, unemployment has a consistently negative and
statistically significant eﬀect on credit ratings, which suggests that higher unemployment is
associated with lower credit ratings while per capita income is associated with higher credit
ratings across all models. In addition, general revenue—a proxy for the relative tax burden of
the state—and the amount of outstanding debt both have a negative impact on credit ratings.
Results on the political controls are mixed. Revenue limits appear to have no statistically
significant eﬀect on credit ratings; expenditure limits, which restrict the amount of state
government spending, however, have a positive impact. Restrictions on the issuance of debt
and the need of a popular vote majority to issue debt have the expected negative eﬀect on
credit ratings.
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Our core arguments are that the eﬀectiveness of a balanced budget rule increases with
its clarity (H1) and that if a balanced budget rule lacks suﬃcient clarity, then increasing
the strictness of legal enforcement will not increase the rule’s eﬀectiveness (H2). To assess
these arguments, we include an interaction term clarity*strictness to the baseline model. As
column b shows, this interaction is statistically significant and is furthermore robust when
we substitute credit ratings from each of the three agencies (Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch) as the
outcome instead of the consolidated credit rating variable (columns c, d, and e respectively).
To better interpret the interaction between clarity and strictness, we construct plots that
show how the predicted probability of a bond falling into the “best” credit rating category
changes as a function of rule clarity and strictness. Figure 1 shows the likelihood of a bond
obtaining the “best” credit rating at low and high levels of strictness as rule clarity increases,
with all other variables held at their means. As expected, if strictness is high (right plot), the
probability of attaining the “best” credit rating rises with rule clarity, from about 20 percent
at the lowest value of clarity to 75 percent at maximum clarity. More tellingly, if strictness is
low (left plot), the likelihood of attaining the “best” credit rating still rises with clarity, from
24 percent to slightly under 36 percent.
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Table 2: Ordered Probit Estimates of the Eﬀects of Rule Clar-
ity and Strictness on State GO Bond Credit Ratings
Variable a b c (Moody’s) d (S&P) e (Fitch)
Explanatory Variable
Rule Clarity 0.09*** -0.87*** 0.57*** -0.89*** -0.87***
(0.04) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
Rule Strictness 0.22*** -0.08 0.00 -0.08 -0.24***
(0.03) (0.06) 0.06 (0.05) (0.06)
Two-Way Interaction
Clarity*Strictness 0.12*** 0.08**** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Controls
Unemployment -0.26*** -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.38*** -0.24***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Per capita income 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.08** 0.10*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
General Revenue -0.73*** -0.66*** -0.79*** -0.27* -0.28*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Debt Outstanding -0.33*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.66*** 0.09
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Revenue Limit 0.08 0.02 0.18 0.62*** 0.18
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Expenditure Limit 0.35** 0.35** 0.42** 0.10 -0.04
(1523) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Debt Issuance Restriction -0.60*** -0.64*** -0.42** -0.27* 0.14
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16)
Popular Vote Requirement -0.28** -0.42** -0.44** -0.34** 0.22
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
N 521 521 521 521 521
Robust standard errors are shown in (parentheses). *** indicates statistical significance at
p < :01, ** at p < :05, and * at p < :1.
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Figure 2 reveals how the probability of a bond getting the “best” credit rating changes at
low and high levels of clarity as rule strictness increases, with all other variables at their means.
If rule clarity is high (right plot), then increasing strictness does increase the likelihood of
attaining the “best” credit rating. However, if rule clarity is low, then increasing strictness
actually decreases the chances of obtaining the “best” credit rating. This suggests that the
strictness of a rule does not oﬀset the lack of clarity. Instead, if a rule is unclear, increasing
strictness has the perverse eﬀect of lowering the probability of getting the “best” credit rating.
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Figure 2: Predicted Probability of “Best” Credit Rating as Strictness Changes at Low and

















































































Taken together, these results suggest the importance of clarity on the rule’s eﬀectiveness.
We would emphasize that the observation that state balanced budget rules in the US have
‘worked’ is entirely consistent with our model. State defaults have been extremely rare since
the enactment of balanced rules in the mid-19th Century—indeed none have occurred since
1933 (Wallis and Weingast 2008). But all of these findings could be explained as a result of
the role that state balanced budget rules play in coordinating decentralized punishment of
states (or the threat of such punishment) by bond markets.
Finally, the actual experiences of state governments that come into conflict with balanced
budget rules is more consistent with our ‘law as focal point’ causal argument than with the
‘law as threat of judicial sanction’ argument. Consider briefly the experience of the state
of California in 2009, when the deadlocked legislature was unable to fulfill its mandate to
pass a balanced budget, which led the state government to run out of cash and to issue
IOUs to state employees, suppliers and other creditors. In reaction to this fiasco, bond
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rating agencies sharply downgraded California’s credit rating and the spread between the
yield on its General Obligation and AAA rated municipal bonds reached an all-time high
of 172 basis points (Lockyer 2009). In other words, when California temporarily violated
its balanced budget rule, bond markets stepped in immediately and forcefully to punish the
state by charging higher interest rates. California soon succumbed to the pressure and passed
a balanced budget. Throughout this episode, there was no talk of litigation that might lead
a court to settle the budget dispute and balance the budget for the deadlocked legislators.
The shadow of the law, the specter of coercive judicial enforcement of balanced budget rules
that supposedly gives force to state balanced budget rules was notable only in its absence.
Indeed, if investors had expected that the courts would soon step in to enforce the state’s
balanced budget rules and to force politicians to balance the budget, there would have been
no reason for the state’s borrowing costs to spike. The very fact that borrowing costs spiked
when the rule is violated is evidence against the ‘law as threat of judicial sanction’ argument.
By contrast, the fact that borrowing costs spiked when the state was unable to pass a balanced
budget is consistent with our argument that the balanced budget rule served as a focal point
for decentralized enforcement by bond markets. Put another way, the bond markets could
react the way they did because the balanced budget rule allowed them to identify California’s
fiscal situation and to coordinate a swift response.
New Structurally Balanced Budget Rules in the Eurozone
The eurozone sovereign debt crisis revealed the failure of the governance regime that had
been put in place at the inception of the euro to prevent eurozone states from accumulating
excessive deficits. As EU leaders reform eurozone governance in the wake of the crisis,
they seek to reduce political discretion over fiscal policy, empowering courts to enforce
balanced budget rules to ensure member state fiscal discipline. This approach is manifest
in the Fiscal Compact Treaty, which requires eurozone governments and other signatories
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to impose legally binding, ‘structurally balanced budget’ rules, to be enforced by national
courts. However, the analysis of the impact of balanced budget rules we developed above
suggests that the EU’s eﬀort to judicialize fiscal policy through balanced budget provisions of
the Fiscal Compact Treaty is unlikely to succeed.
To place the EU’s current approach in perspective, we must turn briefly back to the
regime for eurozone governance initially established under the Maastricht Treaty. In the
Maastricht Treaty, the EU put in place two devices intended to prevent member states from
accumulating excessive debt. First, under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) states were
required to limit their deficit and debt levels. Second, to protect against moral hazard and
bolster market discipline, the Maastricht Treaty contained a ‘no bailout’ clause (Article 104b)
stating that neither the Community nor any individual member state could bailout (i.e. as-
sume the debts of) another member state. Ultimately, however, both pillars of the Maastricht
regime broke down. The Stability and Growth Pact crumbled in the mid-2000s after Ger-
many and France, with the support of other member states, managed to violate its provisions
with impunity. The no bailout rule fell with the Greek crisis, when the EU—unwilling
to countenance a disorderly Greek default—agreed to cooperate with the IMF on a bailout
of Greece. Bailouts for Ireland and Portugal followed soon after, and in February 2011,
EU leaders agreed to establish a permanent bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM).
As the cornerstones of the Maastricht eurozone governance regime were crumbling, EU
leaders moved rapidly—if rather haphazardly—to construct a new regime designed to limit
the moral hazard of member states running up unsustainable debts and turning again and
again to the EU for bailouts. In December 2011, EU lawmakers agreed to the so-called
“Six-Pack” of economic governance reforms, which strengthened the European Commis-
sion’s powers to monitor member state fiscal performance and to sanction those that violated
EU requirements (European Commission 2011). In February 2012, EU leaders went a step
further, with twenty-five governments signing the Fiscal Compact Treaty. In part, the Com-
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pact simply restated and raised the profile of measures already agreed to in the ‘Six-Pack’,
but the Compact did change the EU’s approach in one crucial respect. Previous approaches
to ensuring fiscal discipline had precluded a role for the judiciary and had relied on EU-level
political institutions such as the Council and Commission. But the Compact Treaty sought
to both judicialize and decentralize fiscal discipline, requiring all twenty-five signatory states
to enshrine a balanced budget rule and an automatic correction mechanism (debt-brake) in
domestic law and to enforce these rules through their national courts. In a sense, the Com-
pact Treaty tried to create by fiat a system with important similarities to that found in the
US, where 49 of the 50 states have embedded balanced budget rules in state law.
As discussed above, this approach to fiscal discipline has had considerable success in the
US. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that the Fiscal Compact Treaty’s approach to ensuring
member state fiscal discipline will not work. To be fair, a number of the measures in the
Compact Treaty and the Six-Pack—such as the strengthening of the Commission’s surveil-
lance of national budgets—will enhance transparency and prevent the sort of fiscal deception
that went on in Greece. These reforms will also make it easier for markets to discipline
governments. However, other central elements of the new regime—those that focus on
judicializing fiscal policy—are unlikely to function as hoped, in part because their design is
based on a misunderstanding of the role law and courts play in maintaining fiscal discipline.
Two sets of factors explain why the national balanced budget laws called for in the fiscal
compact treaty are unlikely to work.
First, our argument suggests that balanced budget laws can work because they provide a
focal point that enables investors to coordinate on when to punish governments for running
excessive deficits—not because they establish a credible threat that the judiciary will step in
to force governments to balance their budgets. From this perspective, the crucial attribute of
a balanced budget rule is not the strength of its legal enforcement mechanisms, but rather its
clarity. The clearer the rule in question, the more obvious it is when a government violates
that rule and the better investors can coordinate on enforcing the rule (see Hypotheses 1 and
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2 above). However, the “structurally balanced budget” rules called for in the Fiscal Compact
Treaty are anything but clear. The Treaty focuses on the legal enforceability of the rules, but
leaves the rules themselves extremely vague. Therefore, they are unlikely to help coordinate
decentralized punishment of irresponsible governments.
Contrary to widespread reporting, the Fiscal Compact Treaty does not impose a clear-cut
balanced budget rule on member states. Instead, the Treaty relies on the much more elastic
concept of a structurally balanced budget and even then provides substantial discretion by
allowing violations of the structural balanced budget rule in exceptional circumstances. A
structurally balanced budget rule does not require a government to balance its budget every
year, but rather requires that the budget be balanced across the business cycle. This allows for
governments to engage in Keynesian countercyclical policies during economic downturns,
but then requires them to make up for this by running surpluses during periods of growth.
Treaty Article 3(1)(b) explains that a state’s budget will be considered to be ‘balanced’ if, “the
annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term
objective, as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower limit of a structural
deficit of 0.5% of the gross domestic product at market prices.”1⁵ Article 3(1)(c) further
allows that states “may temporarily deviate from their respective medium-term objective or
the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances.” Precisely what constitutes
a cyclically adjusted, structurally balanced budget is subject to interpretation and debate.
Likewise, precisely what might constitute allowable ‘exceptional’ circumstances is open to
interpretation. These vague concepts will not serve as clear focal points that could coordinate
decentralized punishment by bond markets of excessive sovereign borrowing.
Supporters of the Treaty’s fiscal rules have made much of the fact that states are required
to embed them in national law “through provisions of binding force and permanent char-
acter, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered
to throughout the national budgetary processes” and to back them with an automatic “cor-
1⁵States with lower total debt loads are allowed to run slightly higher structural deficits (Article 3(d)).
27ACES CASES 2013.2 Kelemen and Teo
rection mechanism” (Art 3(2)). This legal enforceability might be important if it was the
fear of legal enforcement that restrained government borrowing. But we suggest that fear of
legal enforcement is not the causal mechanism through which balanced budget rules keep
governments in check. Indeed, court rulings concerning fiscal policy are just as likely to
undermine government eﬀorts to cut deficits as they are to aid such eﬀorts. If instead it
is decentralized punishment by bond markets that discourages governments from violating
fiscal rules, then the clarity of those rules is paramount. And that clarity is strikingly absent
in the provisions of the Fiscal Compact Treaty.
Secondly, in the EU the background conditions that surround these balanced budget rules
undermine the credibility of the rules. Scholars of fiscal federalism emphasize that market
forces can only eﬀectively discipline subnational borrowing if there is no perceived chance of
a bailout by the central government or central bank (Bordo et al. 2011, p.6, 26; Hallerberg
2010). Thus, for instance, in the US, state level balanced budget rules have been able to
restrain state deficits because the federal government had established a credible commitment
not to bailout states. With the establishment of the ESM, there is now a permanent struc-
ture in place designed to provide bailouts to EU member states. And while there is always
uncertainty around the availability of bailouts and the extent of private sector involvement,
at minimum, the possibility of bailouts under the ESM is likely to reduce the eﬀectiveness of
market discipline to some extent.
Conclusion
Typically, law is understood as a sanctioning device, backed up by the threat of coercive le-
gal enforcement. In this view, actors operate under the shadow of the law, and law acts as
a deterrent to help achieved desired behavior. This article highlights another—but no less
eﬀective—function of law: law can act as a focal point for beliefs and facilitate decentralized
enforcement. We argue that balanced budget rules work not because governments fear legal
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enforcement, but because these rules allow bond markets to react more eﬃciently—by rais-
ing interest rates for instance—and thereby discipline the potentially profligate government.
Balanced budget rules serve as a public signal that reveals information about the government’s
fiscal situation and more importantly, provides a focal point around which bond markets can
coordinate. The eﬀectiveness of this expressive function of law, however, hinges on its clarity
and precision. If balanced budget rules work by coordinating decentralized punishment by
the bond markets, then clarity, not strictness, is the key feature of the rule. We demonstrate
that in the US, state balanced budget rules have proven more eﬀective where they had greater
clarity, and that where rules are unclear, increasing the strictness of enforcement does not
increase rules’ eﬀectiveness. Our findings suggest that existing studies on the impact of state
balanced budget suﬀer from omitted variable bias, overestimating the impact of strictness
due to neglecting the impact of clarity. We show that in the EU, the ‘structurally balanced
budget rules’ called for under the Fiscal Compact Treaty are far less clear than any of the
rules found in US states, and conclude that we should not expect them to play a significant
role in ensuring fiscal discipline in the eurozone. Balanced budget rules and other fiscal rules
are increasingly popular around the world in countries struggling to limit their debt. Our
analysis suggests that such rules are only likely to have the desired eﬀect if great emphasis is
placed on their clarity and not simply on their judicial enforceability.
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Technical Appendix
Proposition 1. There exists a linear equilibrium in the game, bi = xi + (1  )y, where
 =
(1  )
 + (1  ) (1)
Proof. Recall that buyer i’s utility function is:
ui = [ (1  )| {z }
concern for government’s fiscal situation
+ B|{z}
concern for other buyers’ actions
]bi
Let bi(Ii) be buyer i’s decision given her information set, Ii. The information set Ii
consists of the government’s public signal y and i’s private signal, xi, i.e. the pair (y; xi) that
captures all information available to i.











where Ei() is the conditional expectation Ei(jIi).
Suppose that the mass of buyers is following a linear strategy such that:
bj(Ij) = xj + (1  )y (2)
Then buyer i’s conditional expectation of the average expected action across all buyers,
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B, is:
Ei(B) = (y + xi
 + 




)xi + (1  
 + 
)y (3)
Substituting equation (3) into equation (2), buyer i’s optimal action is:
bi(Ii) = (1  )Ei() + Ei(B)











)xi + (1  (+ 1  )
 + 
)y (4)
Comparing coeﬃcients from equations (2) and (4), we have
xj + (1  )y = ((+ 1  )
 + 






Solving for , we get
 =
(1  )
 + (1  )
Consequently, bi , the equilibrium strategy for buyer i, is:
bi (Ii) =
y + (1  )xi
 + (1  )
= xi + (1  )y (5)
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Proposition 2 (Morris and Shin 2002). The equilibrium identified in proposition 1 is the unique
equilibrium of the game.
Proof. The proof follows from Morris and Shin (2002) and is presented in brief here.
Recall that buyer i’s best response is:
bi = (1  )Ei() + Ei(B)
Let E() be the average expectation of  across all buyers. Substituting E() for Ei(B),






To show that the infinite sum is bounded, we solve for Ei( Ek()). To do this, note that











Thus buyer i’s expectation of the average expectation of  across buyers is:










(2 + 2)y + 2xi
( + )2
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and, E2(), the average expectation of the average expectation of  is
E2() = E( E()) =
(2 + 2)y + 2
( + )2
Morris and Shin (2002) show, by induction, the following lemma.





Substituting the result from Lemma 1 into equation (6), we get
bi = (1  )
1X
k=0
k[(1  k+1)y + k+1xi
= (1  (1  )




y + (1  )xi
 + (1  ) (7)
Since equation (7) = equation (5), the linear equilibrium identified in proposition 1 is
unique.
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